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IN COMMON WITH the work of many of the writers associated with 
literary Modernism, Conrad’s fiction demonstrates a real concern with 
time. In his essay “Conrad’s Clocks” David Leon Higdon goes so far as 
to describe Conrad as “one of our century’s great time novelists” (1991: 
8-9). His essay begins: “Conrad’s fiction contains a rogue’s gallery of 
malfunctioning, maimed, abused and abusive timepieces which serve 
their owners perversely… Their presence … unlocks the secret of 
several paradoxical structural problems in his novels” (1991: 1). This 
essay considers the “structural problems” that arise in The Secret Agent, 
arguing that they are inherent in the nature of narrative time and that 
they are derived from the non-narratable nature of the instant. 
 Three distinct attacks on time occur in The Secret Agent. The most 
obvious is the attempted terrorist attack on the Greenwich Royal 
Observatory. The second attack on time can be located in the novel’s 
complex narrative structure and the final and most successful attack 
comes in the novel’s consideration of the instant of death and of the 
impossibility of the instant appearing in narrative. R. W. Stallman 
effectively deals with the first two and thus the third is the focus here, 
the two first being briefly discussed. 
 
Attack One 
 
As Sherry (1966) and others have noted, Conrad based The Secret Agent 
on a real-life attempt to blow up the Greenwich Royal Observatory in 
1894, by which time Greenwich had been recognized as the zero 
meridian, the point from which all time zones are measured, and 
therefore as a symbol of universal time it provided the perfect anarchist 
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target. The real-life attempt failed when Martial Bourdin, a French 
anarchist, was fatally injured in an accidental explosion before reaching 
his target. Verloc’s attempt fails when Stevie trips on his way to the 
Observatory, accidentally detonating the bomb he is carrying. 
Consequently, in the plot of The Secret Agent literally charts the failure of 
this attempt to destroy clock time. 
 The second, more effective, challenge to clock time occurs not at the 
plot level but in narrative structure. Conrad rarely present events in 
chronologically, instead circling around key moments, elongating 
stretches of time, and repeating certain events while compressing and 
omitting others. The novel thus cries out to be read in a way that 
registers the distinction between story (what happens) and narrative (the 
way it is organized), what Gérard Genette describes as narrative’s 
“doubly temporal sequence” (1980: 33). 
 The novel’s structural anachrony has been well documented. Stallman 
suggests that in terms of story time chronology the chapters would run 1, 
2, 3, 8, 9, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 concurrent with 11, 12, 13. Stallman’s conclusion 
is to link the structure of the novel with its subject: “The theme of The 
Secret Agent has to do with time, the destruction and confusion of time 
itself, and the confused chronology of narrated events by their 
disarrangement from time effects a structure which is at one with the 
theme” (1960: 246). This double temporality acknowledges the fact that 
narratives are freed from the constraints of a linear time by what 
Aristotle terms emplotment, the arrangement (or rearrangement) of 
events. The flipside of this is that, providing the novel adheres to 
another of Aristotle’s tenets “wholeness,” the sequence can be 
reconstructed by the reader. That is, put back into a linear order – as 
Stallman so effectively does. Thus, despite its complex narrative structure 
The Secret Agent does not so much challenge temporal consonance as 
foreground the human role in shaping time. Paul Ricoeur, particularly in 
his three-volume Time and Narrative, discusses this in some detail. 
 
Ricoeur and Time 
 
Ricoeur regards narrative as a time-bound form, organizing and 
interpreting events within a temporal framework in order to make them 
intelligible on what he describes as a “human level,” pursuing the 
hypothesis that narrative is not only always temporal but also that it 
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allows the only access to temporality: “Time becomes human time to the 
extent that it is organized after the manner of a narrative; narrative, in 
turn, is meaningful to the extent that it portrays the features of temporal 
experience” (1984: 3). 
 Ricoeur’s argument follows from his reading of Augustine and 
Aristotle. From the former he takes the idea of the “three-fold present.” 
This formulation, which is taken from the Confessions, emerges from 
Augustine’s attempt to account for the notion that the present has no 
duration. Augustine writes: 
 
the only time that can be called present is an instant …that 
cannot be divided even into the most minute fractions, and a 
point of time as small as this passes so rapidly from the future to 
the past that its duration is without length. For if its duration 
were prolonged, it could be divided into past and future. When it 
is present it has no duration. (1961: 266) 
 
In order to solve this problem Augustine develops the idea of a three-
fold present in which time is conceived as having being only inasmuch as 
the past and future exist in the present of the mind as memory and 
expectation. 
 The usefulness of Augustine’s formulation for the study of narrative, 
where past, present and future can be equated with beginning, middle 
and end, becomes readily apparent when Ricoeur introduces Aristotle’s 
Poetics. Ricoeur picks up the idea of “emplotment,” which he describes as 
“an eminently verbal experience where concordance mends 
discordance,” or more plainly as “the organizing of events” (1984: 31, 
34). This organization is readily apparent in the convoluted narrative 
structure of The Secret Agent. Emplotment is the narrating activity that 
allows what Ricoeur calls “human time” to emerge. 
 In common with Aristotle’s Poetics, Ricoeur’s analysis pivots on the 
notion of wholeness, and he quotes Aristotle’s claim that “a thing is a 
whole if it has a beginning, a middle, and an end” going on to state that 
“it is only in virtue of poetic composition that something counts as a 
beginning, middle, or end … the ideas of beginning, middle, and end are 
not taken from experience. They are not features of some real action but 
the effects of the ordering of the poem” (Ricoeur 1984: 38-39). 
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 Thus, the human intervention required by Augustine’s three-fold 
present is comparable to the Aristotelian notion of emplotment. Both are 
activities by which experience is ordered and through which time is 
understood. Accordingly, Ricoeur’s use of Augustine’s philosophical 
analysis of time and Aristotle’s discussion of poetics allows him to 
conclude that: “time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated 
through a narrative mode, and narrative attains full meaning when it 
becomes a condition of temporal existence” (1984: 52). The three-fold 
present of human time comes into being with narrating activity. 
 
Time and Death 
 
If the narrative structure of The Secret Agent succeeds in depicting time as 
human time, as organized and narratized time, it would appear that in 
doing so it makes it clear that human time is a narrating act for which 
time is characterized as sequential. In this way time asks a question of 
narrative: If the three-fold model of time is an act of narrating necessary 
to allow human time to emerge from a sequence of instants, how is 
narrative sustained when it encounters the problem of narrating the 
instant as an instant, as the non-passage of time? The attempt to narrate 
the instant is the third challenge to time in The Secret Agent and appears in 
what will prove to be the limit case for narrative: the instant of death. 
 Skipping over some rather complex ground I justify this use of death 
by offering a link between Augustine’s claim that time “cannot be 
measured after it has passed, because nothing then exists to be 
measured” (1961: 269) with Derrida’s description of death as an aporia, 
“as what cannot pass [passer] or come to pass” (1993: 23). Thus, in The 
Secret Agent, the instant of death (and death itself) is refused narrative. 
 It is notable that the narrator of The Secret Agent makes a point of 
recording the times of the story’s three deaths. Stevie, who stumbles on 
his way to plant the bomb at the Greenwich Observatory dies at half past 
eleven. Ossipon reads the details of his death in a newspaper: “Bomb in 
Greenwich Park. There isn’t much so far. Half past eleven” (59). Adolf 
Verloc, the next to die, is murdered by his wife at “ten minutes to nine” 
(198). Finally, Winnie Verloc takes her own life at “five o’clock in the 
morning” (230). Despite the importance apparently allocated to the times 
at which the three members of the Verloc household die there is a certain 
imprecision in the relation. Each of these times is mediated without the 
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impersonal narrator’s authority – by a ten-day old newspaper, by a ticking 
clock noticed by Winne moments after she murders her husband, and by 
the crew of the trans-Channel ferry who arrive too late to witness the 
instant of death. This tendency is typified by Stevie’s death which, in 
terms of Verloc’s plans, comes at the wrong time. Consequently, when 
Chief Inspector Heat questions Verloc about Stevie’s death, asking, “The 
bang startled you, eh?”, Verloc replies: “Yes; it came too soon” (158). 
The instant of death presents a problem to narrative for which it can only 
come either too soon or too late, a conflict encapsulated by the disavowal 
of Winnie Verloc’s idea that “clocks and watches always stopped at the 
moment of murder for the undoing of the murderer” (202). This failed 
attempt at precision, the continued ticking of the clock, suggests a 
refusal, or inability, to include the instant of death in the narrative. 
 Given that these three deaths are marked, however inaccurately, the 
obscure manner of their presentation in the narrative also striking. 
Stallman notes that, “of the three main events – the explosion, the 
murder, and the suicide – only the murder scene is presented as point-
present action, whereas the first and final events are reported piecemeal 
through multiple points of view” (1960: 245). Terry Eagleton describes 
this aspect of the narrative: 
 
The killing of Stevie is unpresented – happens, so to speak, in the reader’s 
absence; and the murder of Verloc is presented with extreme obliquity, 
squinted at sideways rather than frontally encountered. Both events reveal 
sinister forces capable of destroying the quotidian forces which must be 
“shown” at the same time as the novel proclaims the impossibility of 
attesting textually to their authentic existence. (1996: 160) 
 
Eagleton’s use of the word “authentic” indicates what might be described 
as a doubling of death within narrative. The first death in the narrative is 
the death of the Other that circulates at the level of language. The second 
death, the authentic death, which might be called the philosopher’s death, 
is that linked to the aporetic instant and refuses itself to narrative. 
 This doubling is evident in the depiction of Verloc’s murder, which 
unlike the deaths of Stevie and Winnie, is presented: Verloc, lying on the 
couch, “saw partly on the ceiling a clenched hand holding a carving knife. 
It flickered up and down. Its movements were leisurely. They were 
leisurely enough for Mr Verloc to recognise the limb and the weapon” 
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(197). The “leisurely” nature of the instant in which Winnie Verloc 
plunges the knife into her husband continues into the next paragraph as 
Conrad presents Verloc’s last thoughts, emphasizing this expanse of 
time, a “flicker” in which Verloc can do no more than utter the word 
“Don’t.” The next three sentences begin “They were leisurely enough” 
until the sequence (itself a retardation of time) concludes, “But they were 
not leisurely enough to allow Mr Verloc the time to move either hand or 
foot” (197). In this final sentence there is a kind of temporal anachrony 
that distinguishes between the instant of death and the time of death as it 
appears in the narrative. 
 Following on from this notion of doubled death/time, one can read a 
short passage in which Chief Inspector Heat examines Stevie’s remains. 
This will make clearer the kind of temporal duality that emerges when 
death appears in The Secret Agent:  
 
The man, whoever he was, had died instantaneously; and yet it 
seemed impossible to believe that a human body could have 
reached that state of disintegration without passing through the 
pangs of inconceivable agony. No physiologist, and still less of a 
metaphysician, Chief Inspector Heat rose by the force of sympathy, 
which is a form of fear, above the vulgar conception of time. 
Instantaneous! He remembered all he had ever read in popular 
publications of long and terrifying dreams dreamed in the instant of 
waking; of the whole past life lived with frightful intensity by a 
drowning man as his doomed head bobs up, screaming, for the last 
time. The inexplicable mysteries of conscious existence beset Chief 
Inspector Heat till he evolved a horrible notion that ages of 
atrocious pain and mental torture could be contained between two 
successive winks of an eye. And meantime the Chief Inspector went 
on peering at the table with a calm face and the slightly anxious 
attention of an indigent customer bending over what may be called 
the by-products of a butcher’s shop with a view to an inexpensive 
Sunday dinner. (71) 
 
This passage is selected because of its interrelation of the instant with the 
“meantime,” a relation enacted both at the level of story, what the extract 
says, and at the level of narrative, how it is said. The passage is interesting 
because of the way it illustrates the narrative’s incapacity to render the 
instant. The word “passage” is used deliberately: narrative as passage, as 
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movement between beginning and ending, is what this reading focuses 
on, picking out for attention, at this preliminary stage, “instantaneous,” 
“passing through,” “till he evolved,” and “meantime.” 
 The instant, the theme of Heat’s thoughts, is introduced in the first 
sentence, “The man, whoever he was, had died instantaneously.” As 
Heat evolves “the horrible notion that ages of atrocious pain and mental 
torture could be contained within two successive winks of an eye,” the 
narrative enacts its own elongation of the instant by moving back and 
forth between Chief Inspector’s mind and the narrator’s voice. 
 A summary of the narrative structure makes clear the way that the 
doubly temporal nature of the passage refuses to relate the time of death 
as an instant. The section begins with a sentence that reveals the process 
of Heat’s thoughts. It then shifts to the voice of the narrator to 
comment on Heat and his credentials as a theorist of time: he is “No 
physiologist, and still less of a metaphysician.” The third sentence signals 
a return to Heat’s mind, returning both the Chief Inspector and the 
reader to the opening of the passage, with the repetition of 
“Instantaneous!”, the multiple syllables of this single word refusing the 
possibility of containing what it speaks of. The next two sentences reveal 
Heat’s thoughts as organized by the narrator, gradually increasing the 
presence of the narrator, who returns in full in the final sentence. This 
last sentence shifts the mood, removing the scene from Heat’s mind with 
the grim humour characteristic of the novel. The way in which this 
passage links Heat’s meditation on the instant with the notion of a non-
instantaneous “meantime” demonstrates the contradictions inherent in 
the attempt to “think through” the instant. In the enactment of the 
“meantime,” the extract’s narrative structure reveals its nature as passage. 
Narrative, revealing its three-fold nature must, like the Chief Inspector’s 
thoughts, “evolve” in a “passing through” that characterizes narrative as 
a “meantime” that assumes the possibility of its ending. 
 As Conrad’s text problematizes the instant, the Chief Inspector 
cannot help but elongate the instant of Stevie’s death. He does this by 
imagining Stevie at the very moment of his death, “passing through the 
pangs of inconceivable agony.” This passing through is exactly what 
death and the instant refuse to time and, simultaneously, what 
characterizes narrative. Death admits no “meantime,” and the problem 
of fixing the instant of death, which allows no further passage of time, 
comes sharply into focus. Recalling Augustine, the three-fold notion of 
time was introduced to allow the thinking of the present to appear. If the 
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narrative process “humanizes” time, to use Ricoeur’s phrase, then the 
instant of death would appear to institute an aporia into this notion of 
time. How, if the present is understood in relation to the past and the 
future, can the instant of death, which is that for which there is no 
passage, appear in narrative? 
 By way of a conclusion, I should like to equate the state of Stevie’s 
body with the state of narrative. In a “state of disintegration,” it 
resembles “the by-products of a butcher’s shop” (71). There is a degree 
of irony in the local constable’s words when he tells Heat, “He’s all 
there. Every bit of him” (70). As Stallman wryly notes, “Poor Stevie 
never was all there” (1960: 238). The boy has been scraped up with a 
shovel and yet the text insists on his completeness: the constable 
continues, “Well, here he is – all of him I could see” (72), and again, 
“here he is all complete, velvet collar and all. I don’t think I missed a 
single piece of him as big as a postage stamp” (73). This insistence on 
Stevie’s wholeness suggests that his death has lent him a completeness 
not possessed during his life. It is this completeness towards which 
narrative moves, and yet it would seem that there is a certain stumbling 
in the attempt to pronounce the end that leaves the meantime in a state 
of disintegration. 
 
 
Acknowledgement 
 
A version of this essay was presented at the 31st Annual International 
Conference of the Joseph Conrad Society (UK), Amsterdam, July 2005. 
 
Works cited 
 
Augustine. Confessions, translated by R. S. Pine-Coffin. Harmondsworth:  
 Penguin, 1961. 
Derrida, Jacques. Aporias, translated by Thomas Dutoit. Stanford: Stanford 
 University Press, 1993. 
Eagleton, Terry. “Form, Ideology and The Secret Agent.” In Joseph Conrad: 
 Contemporary Critical Essays, edited by Elaine Jordan. 000-00. Houndmills: 
 Macmillan, 1996. 
Genette, Gérard. Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method, translated by Jane 
 E. Lewin. Oxford: Blackwell, 1980. 
Higdon, David Leon. “Conrad’s Clocks.” The Conradian 16.1 (1991): 8-9. 
Ricoeur, Paul. Time and Narrative, translated by Kathleen McLaughlin and David 
 Pallauer. 3 Vols. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1984. 
  
9 
  
Sherry, Norman. Conrad’s Western World. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
 Press, 1966. 
Stallman, R. W. “Time and The Secret Agent” (1959). In Joseph Conrad: A Critical  
 Symposium, ed. R. W. Stallman. 234-54. East Lansing: Michigan State 
 University Press, 1960. 
